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LABOR LAw- FAIR LABOR STANDARDS AcT OF 1938- DEFINITION OF
"CoMMERCE" - - APPLICABILITY TO ACTIVITY EssENTIALLY LoCAL IN NATURE - Defendant owned and operated three warehouses in the city of Chicago
where merchandise received from several states was processed and/or stored until
it was ready for distribution to defendant's retail stores. Such stores were located
in the Chicago area, some being in Illinois and some a sliort distance within
Indiana. Plaintiff, Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor, sought to enjoin defendant from violating the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938,1 claiming that a substantial number of the employees
working in defendant's warehouses were "engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce" as that phrase is used in the act. Held, injunction denied. The Fair Labor Standards Act was not applicable to these particular
employees. Fleming v. Goldblatt Bros., (D. C. Ill. 1941) 39 F. Supp. 701.
The applicability of the Fair Labor Standards Act depends upon the activity
of the particular employees involved, for by its terms the act is expressly limited
to those employees who are "engaged in commerce or in the production of goods
for commerce." 2 The court properly recognized this test of applicability,3 and
rejected the "materially affecting" doctrine. 4 The decision included a holding

52 Stat. L. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S. C. (1940), § 201.
The express language of the act is as follows: "Every employer shall pay to each
of his employees who is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce wages at the following rates..••" 52 Stat. L. 1062 (1938), 29 U.S. C. (1940),
§ 206(a). "No employer shall ..• employ any of his employees who is engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce•..." 52 Stat. L. 1063 (1938),
29 U.S. C. (1940), § 207(a).
8 Principal case, 39 F. Supp. 701 at 703.
4 The legislative history of the act supports this view. See Jewell Tea Co. v.
Williams, (C. C. A. 10th, 1941) 118 F. (2d) 202 at 206, note 5; approved and
quoted in Gerdert v. Certified Poultry & Egg Co., (D. C. Fla. 1941) 38 F. Supp.
964 at 969, note I. See citations there and also S. REP. 884, 75th Cong., 3d sess.
(1938), p. 5; Forsythe, "Legislative History of the Fair Labor Standards Act," 6 LAW.
& CONTEMP. PROB. 464 (1939).
Cases have consistently held to this effect. Jax Beer Co. v. Redfern, (C. C. A.
5th, 1941) 124 F. (2d) 172; Swift & Co. v. Wilkerson, (C. C. A. 5th, 1941) 124 F.
(2d) 176; Jewell Tea Co. v. Williams, (C. C. A. 10th, 1941) 118 F. (2d) 202;
Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., (D. C. Fla. 1941) 43 F. Supp. 445; Fleming v.
Arsenal Bldg. Corp., (D. C. N. Y. 1941) 38 F. Supp. 207; Baggett v. Henry Fischer
Packing Co., (D. C. Ky, 1941) 37 F. Supp. 670; Gerdert v. Certified Poultry & Egg
Co., (D. C. Fla. 1941) 38 F. Supp. 964; Eddings v. Southern Dairies, (D. C. S. C.
1942) 42 F. Supp. 664.
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that transferring goods from the warehouses in Chicago to the stores in Indiana
did not constitute "commerce" as that term is used in the Fair Labor Standards
Act; this holding the court based on its opinion that the transportation was essentially local in nature since it took place within one metropolitan area, aml that
the act did not contemplate activity of this type. 5 It is clear that this movement
of goods across a state line could be regulated as interstate commerce,6 and it is
arguable that Congress intended such movement to be "commerce" as defined
in the act. The transportation not only fitted the statutory definition of "commerce," 1 but according to the interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act
made by the Wage and Hour Administrator, it seems that no exception on this
basis was intended. 8 One of the fundamental purposes of Congress in passing
the act was to raise the standard of living of employees wherever they came under
the jurisdiction of Congress to regulate, 9 and so other courts have generally held
5 Principal case, 39 F. Supp. 701 at 705. "Therefore, I do not believe that such
a purely local transaction as transferring its goods from its Illinois warehouses to its
Indiana retail stores is such an activity as is contemplated by the act when it refers to
those 'engaged in commerce' or 'in the production of goods for commerce.' "
It is not clear that the court limited its decision to an interpretation of "commerce," although that would seem to be all that was necessary to the decision; the
opinion appears to indicate that this movement should not be called interstate commerce
for any purpose. ''While the region where the activities are carried on embraces portions of two states, nevertheless the activities themselves comprise a continuous and
integrated business and economic unit, local in character, such as naturally grow up
adjacent to a great metropolitan center such as Chicago; and to hold that such a local
activity constitutes interstate commerce would destroy the distinction between what is
national and what is local." Principal case, 39 F. Supp. 701 at 705.
6 Hanley v. Kansas City Southern R.R., 187 U.S. 617, 23 S. Ct. 214 (1903);
Caskey Baking Co. v. Virginia, 313 U.S. u7, 61 S. Ct. 881 (1941); Yohn v. United
States, (C. C. A. 2d, 1922) 280 F. 51 I. And to the effect that there is no need to have
title pass, see Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 303
U.S. 453, 58 S. Ct. 656 (1938).
1 The Fair Labor Standards Act defines commerce as follows: "'Commerce' means
trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several
States or from any state to any place outside thereof.'' 52 Stat. L. 1060 (1938), 29
U. S. C. (1940), § 203(b).
8 The Interpretative Bulletins of the administrator show a very liberal and general
attitude concerning coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act. See INTERPRETATIVE
BULLETINS Nos. 1 and 5, 1941 WAGE AND HouR MANUAL 27-34. While the administrator apparently has not ruled on this exact point, he does seem to reject any theory
of an implied exception where the activity might be called local in nature even though
a state line has been crossed. See Wage and Hour Opinion Letter of August 22, 1941,
in 2 C. C.H., LABOR LAW SERVICE, 3d ed., 1f 33.01 I (1941). Here a service man for
a New Jersey company had to go to a Pennsylvania warehouse to obtain an oil burner
which was to be installed for a customer in New Jersey. The opinion was that the
Fair Labor Standards Act did apply.
9 52 Stat. L. 1060 (1938), 29 U. S. C. (1940), § 202: "Congressional finding
and declaration of policy. (a) The Congress hereby finds that the existence in industries
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, of labor conditions
detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health,
efficiency, and general well-being of workers (I) causes commerce and the channels
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that it should be liberally construed to that end. 10 The only case which might
be used as authority 11 for allowing the court to distinguish between the local
and interstate character of the particular activity involved the question of the
"materially affecting" doctrine, in determining the extent of the power of Congress to regulate such matters, rather than one of statutory interpretation. Furthermore, it seems significant that in the recent and very similar Motor Carriers Act 12 Congress expressly provided an exception for vehicles operating in
large metropolitan areas like the one involved in the instant case, and yet in the
Fair Labor Standards Act exemptions were provided only on the basis of the type
of work being done by the particular employee. 13 Finally, it is to be noted-that
the interpretation of "commerce" adopted in the principal case could lead to
real difficulties in determining just when a business is essentially local in character/~ especially in cases involving large metropolitan areas so situated as to extend
over the border lines of several states. 15 If the court had decided that "commerce~' should be construed so as to include the transportation of the goods from
the warehouses in Chicago to the stores in Indiana, it seems that it would have
been forced to grant the injunction sought by the plaintiff, for then the come-torest doctrine could not have been used to decide that "commerce" had ended
when the goods reached the warehouses,16 at least not without a consideration
and instrumentalities of'commerce to be used to spread and perpetuate such labor conditions among the workers of the several States. . . ."
Also to this effect was the President's message to Congress of May 24, 1937, on the
need for the act: "Congress cannot interfere in local affairs but when goods pass through
the channels of commerce from one state to another they become subject to the power
of Congress, and the Congress may exercise that power to recognize and protect the
fundamental interests of free labor.
"And so to protect the fundamental interests of free labor and a free people we
piopose .that only goods which have been produced 1:1nder conditions which meet the
minimum standards of free labor shall be admitted to interstate commerce. Goods
produced under conditions which do not meet rudimentary standards of decency should
be regarded as contraband an.d ought not to be allowed to pollute the channels of interstate trade." Quoted in 1941 WAGE & HouR MANUAL 26.
1° Fleming v. A.H. Belo Corp., (C. C. A. 5th, 1941) 121 F. {2d) 207; Fleming
v. Hawkeye Pearl Button Co., {C. C. A. 8th, 1940) II3 F. (2d) 52; Divine v. Levy,
(D. C. La. 1941) 39 F. Supp. 44; Wood v. Central Sand & Gravel Co., (D. C. Tenn.
1940) 33 F. Supp. 40.
11 National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1,
57 S. Ct: 615 (1936).
12 59 Stat. L. 919 (1940), 49 U.S. C. (1940), § 301.
18 52 Stat. L. 1067 (1938), 29 U.S. C. (1940), § 213.
14 Charles Noeding Trucking Co. v. United States, (D. C. N. J. 1939) 29 F.
Supp. 537.
15 The court in the principal case dismissed this argument by saying that he did
not believe that such a danger would result, and that if the line between local and interstate activity should become hazy, it would be time enough to deal with the problem when it arose.
16 The cases upholding the traditional come-to-rest doctrine have required a comh1g to rest so that further interstate transportation of the goods was not involved.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Standard Oil Co., 275 U.S. 257, 48 S. Ct. 107 (1927);
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 857 (1934); Public
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of the length and character of the storage of goods in the warehouses before
they were sent on to the stores in Indiana.17 Moreover, under such a view of
"commerce," the defendant's employees would seem to be "engaged in the
production of goods for commerce," since all the employees involved were occupied either in storing or in processing the goods in the warehouses,18 and the
statutory definition of "produced" appears to be broad enough to cover both
storing and processing.19

Utilities Commission v. Landon, 249 U.S. 236, 39 S. Ct. 268 (1918); Gulf, Colorado
& Santa Fe R.R. v. Texas, 204U. S. 403, 27 S. Ct. 360 (1906); Geraghty v. Lehigh
Valley R. R., (C. C. A. 2d, 1934) 70 F. (2d) 300; C. S. Smith Metropolitan Market
Co. v. Food & Grocery Bureau of Southern California, (D. C. Cal. 1939) 33 F.
Supp. 539.
Likewise in other cases under the Fair Labor Standards Act there has been no
analogous case where this principle was used and further transportation "of the goods
over a state line was contemplated. Jewell Tea Co. v. Williams, (C. C. A. 10th,
1941) II8 F. (2d) 202; Jax Beer Co. v. Redfern, (C. C. A. 5th, 1941) 124 F. (2d)
172; Eddings v. Southern Dairies, (D. C. S. C. 1942) 42 F. Supp. 664; Rauhoff v.
Henry Gramling & Co., (D. C. Ark. 1941) 42 F. Supp, 754; Klotz v. Ippolito,
(D. C. Tex. 1941) 40 F. Supp. 422; Gerdert v. Certified Poultry & Egg Co., (D. C.
Fla. 1941) 38 F. Supp. 964; Rivera v. Central Aguirre Sugar Co., (D. C. Porto Rico,
1941) 4 WAGES & Houn. REP. 272; Brown v. Bailey, 177 Tenn. 185, 147 S. W. (2d)
105 (1941); Serio v. Dee Cigar & Candy Co., (Ala. Cir. Ct. 1941) 4 WAGES & Houn.
REP. 630.
17 Under this view the storage at the warehouse might be held to be only a "pause»
in the "flow" of interstate commerce. Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, 42 S. Ct.
397 (1922); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 25 S. Ct. 276 (1904);
Western Oil Refining Co. v. Lipscomb, 244 U. S. 346, 37 S. Ct. 623 (1917). See
also Higgins v. Carr Bros. Co., (Maine, 1942) 5 WAGES & Houn. REP. 210, which
was decided under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
18 "Defendant ..• engages in two types of operations: (a) merchandising operations consisting of the receipt, storage, and distribution of merchandise, which is
neither changed in form nor processed; and (b) manufacturing operations, consisting
of receipt and processing of goods, and the distribution of the finished product; and
all of the warehouse employees perform work necessary to either or both of these operations." Principal case, 39 F. Supp. 701 at 703.
19 52 Stat. L. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S. C. (1940), § 203(j): "'Produced' means
produced, manufactured, mined, handled, or in any other manner worked on in any
State; and for the purposes of this chapter an employee shall be deemed to have been
engaged in the production of goods for commerce if such employee was employed in
producing, manufacturing, mining, handling, transporting, or in any other manner
working on such goods, or in any process or occupation necessary to the production
thereof, in any State."

